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PARTY WALLS.
AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION.
The act of 1721 declares that the first builder shall be reim-
bursed one moiety of the charge of such party-wall, or for so
much thereof as the next builder shall have occasion to make use
of, * * * the charge or value thereof to be set by the said
regulators." The act of March 6th, 1820, in regard to the Dis-
trict of Kensington, says that the first builder shall be reimbursed
"one moiety of the value of"the party-wall, or of such part thereof
as the second builder uses "the value thereof to be fixed by any one
or more of the regulators, or by arbitrators mutually chosen."
The terms used in the statutes are "charge" and "value," of the
wall. It does not distinctly appear that it has been assumed that
the first builder is in any case entitled to one-half of the cost to
him of the wall. He might have made a reckless contract for the
wall, and paid for it an excessive price. What would have been
the fair cost of the wall, if cost is the standard of the compensa-
tion to be paid, would doubtless be the cost in question. Perhaps
the actual cost would be prima facie evidence of the fair and
proper cost. There may be a very long interval between the erec-
tion of the wall by A and the later use of it by his neighborB, and
the cost of the erection of the wall at the later period might be
greater or less than the actual cost of it. When B uses the wall,
must he pay one-half of what such a wall would cost if then
erected, or one-half of what it did cost A? Distinct answer to
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the question it is difficult to find. In Sauer v. Monroe,' it seems
to be assumed that the first builder would be entitled to recover
one-half of the cost of the wall, if the wall had been properly
built. Black C. J., endorses the "principle" adopted by the trial
court, which he apparently understands to be that the seconA
builder shall pay one-half of what the wall is "worth to himself,
and not an equal share of its cost." The instruction of the trial
court was sufficiently vague. The jury were told to "estimate the
value of the party-wall," and also the damage sustained by the
second builder, in consequence of the leaning of the wall over
upon his lot aid to deduct this damage from the value. For the
difference the defendant would be liable.2 It would seem that tne
second builder should pay one-half of what would be the cost of
such a wall, if erected by himself at the time he wants to use it.
COMPENSATION FOR FRACTIONAL USES.
The second builder may use the entire wall. He must then
pay one-half of its value. If he uses only a part of the wall he
payi for one-half of the value of this part. "Thus, if the wall is
00 feet high, as modern buildings not unfrequently are, and the
? .1. ng owner only desires to use 40 feet of it, he is only
liable for four-tenths of one-half of the cost of the wall, and he
cannot be called upon to pay that, till he begins to make actual
use of it."3
COMPENSATION. WHAT REGARDED AS WALL.
The parties owning contiguous lots may by agreement,
authorize one of them, in erecting the division wall, to deviate
from the standard prescribed by statute. The statute requires
the wall if built on the neighbor's lot to be confined to a certain
distance from the division line and to be continuous to its top.
The parties may agree that it shall be otherwise. They may
agree, e. g., that A, (one of them) may make an alley which shall
120 Pa. 229. In Hoffstot v. Vought, 146 Pa. 632, Mitchell J. says that
the second builder pays one half of the "cost" of so much of the wall as he
uses. The wall being less than six months old, when the second builder
'used it one half of its "cost" seems to be regarded as what he should pay;
Bailey's Appeal, i W. N. 350.
2The wall had been perpendicular at first, butsettled afterwards so that
it leaned'at the top several inches over the proper boundary of a party
wall.
3Hoffstot v. Vought; 148 Pa. 632. Mercantile Library Co. v. University
of Pennsylvania, cited at the end of the first article, is in 220 Pa. 328.
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encr.ach 15 inches upon B's lot, and embrace 15 inches of A's
lot; and that the party-wall shall rise from the top of the alley,
in the normal position of a party-wall. The wall and alley being
thus built, when B subsequently builds against A's house, and the
alley, he must pay one-half of the value, not only of the wall above
the alley, but also of the alley wall and, if B has assigned his lot
to C, who builds the house, C must thus pay for the party-wall.
4
WALL IMPERFECT.
The party-wall may be defective in various ways, and the
defects may influence the amount of compensation to be paid for
its rse. The wall may not be solid but have openings in it, to
admit light, or air. Thus on lot a stood a Music Hall, one of whose
walls rested in part on lot b. This wall, above the line of the tiers
of seats within the hall, was pierced by long narrow slits for
ventilating the Hall. The owner of the lot b used a part of the
wall. The measurer to whom the matter was referred, valued
the portion of the wall used, making "allowance for certain defects
and the cost of repairing them" and awarded $233.14. The
corot ratified the award.5 The party-wall, in settling overh],-
the vacant lot from 1 2 inches to 2 inches. The building msl,-
tor condemned the wall and ordered it to be underpinned before
it should be used. Pursuant to this order, the first builder con-
ferred with the neighbor, who proposed to use it, about the neces-
sary repairs and agreed that the latter should have these repairs
made, and have done whatever was necessary to render the wall
safe. Work was accordingly done at a cost of $90.60 which
defendant paid. The plaintiff's claim for the half of the value
of the wall was $107.37. He was allowed to recover only the
difference betwen these two sums.0 A party-wall having settled
and overhung the vacant lot, the owner of the wall was allowed
to recover from the owner of the vacant lot who used it, one-half
of what it was worth to the latter; "The jury" says Black C. J.,
..were ahiowed to deduct the damage from his part of its price."
What was in fact done, was to deduct the damage arising from
4Haines v. Drips, 2 Pars. 236. It does not appear whether defendant
was required to pay one half of the value of both the alley walls, or only of
the one resting on his ground. They were both parts of the- party wall,
and equitably should be paid for equally by the adjoining owners.
5Oakes v. Senneff, 4 W. N. 413.
6Eppelsheimer v. Steel, 21 W. N. 380.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
the undue encroachment of the wall, from the "valve of the party-
wall used by the defendant."7
WHO ASCERTAIN COMPENSATION.
The value of the wall, says the act of 1721, is "to be set by
the said regulators." The act of 1720, concerning Kensington,
says the value shall be "fixed by any one or more of the regulators,
or by arbitrators mutually chosen." Of this provision of the
act of 1720, Black C. J., remarked that he would not say that it
might be disregarded in all cases; "but where the last builder
breaks into and uses the wall without notice to the other party
of his intention to do so, he must be considered as declining to
choose arbitrators, and as waiving his right to a decision by the
regulators." The jury in the trial of the action for compensa-
tion, must then ascertain it.8 The parties referred the matter to
a measurer, who measured and valued the portion of the wall used,
making allowance for necessary repairs of defects. The court
required payment of the amount thus found.' In Fidelity Co. v.
Hafner 0 the plaintiff's declaration averred that the "proper sur-
veyor and regulator duly st the charge and value" of the part of
the wall used by the defendant, "of which the defendant had
notice." The plaintiff, in Bailey's Appeal" had the cost of the
new party-wall calculated and apportioned by the measurers of
the Bricklayer's Society. The court enjoined against the use
of the wall until payment of this amount.
WALL NOT A PARTY-WALL. COMPENSATION FOR USE.
If a wall erected by A is in part on what is now B's lot, and
is nevertheless not a party-wall, B, owning the ground beneath
a part of the wall, may use without compensation, so much of this
wall as is within his own boundaries. Thus, A erects a house
on his land, owning land to the east of it. He conveys the land
to the east, including a strip 3 inches wide in front and 2Y2 inches
wide in the rear, on which the wall rests. This wall, when erected
was not a party-wall,1 2 for a party-wall is one which when built, is
built in part on the land of another than the "first builder." So
7Sauer v. Monroe, 20 Pa. 219.
8Sauer v. Monroe, 20 Pa. 219.
9Oakes v. Senneff, 4 W. N. 03.
106 Super. 48.
"I W. N. 350.
12Amer v. Longstreth, io Pa. 145; Oat v. Middleton, 2 Miles, 247; Fin-
ley v. Stuebing, 38 Leg. Int. 386; Beaver v. Nutter, 1o Phila., 345.
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much of it as stands on the ground whose ownership has since been
separated from that of the house, becomes the property of the
owner of that ground. As owner, he can use it without making
compensation to the owner of the house of which it was a part.
His ownership of the ground "certainly confers" says Bell J., "a
right to use so much of the wall as is erected upon his ground,
for any purpose that may be useful t6 him, in the same manner
as if he himself had built it." He may break into it, in order to
rest his joists.13 It is possible however, for A having erected a
building on a part of his lot to convey the vacant part and so much
more as lies under one-half of the eastern wall, and to stipulate
that the grantee shall not make use of this wall without making
compensation. Such a stipulation virtually makes the wall a
party-wall. If A subsequently conveys the building to X who
is aiso the owner of the vacant piece, the right to compensation
passes to X, and is therefore merged. 14
WHEN COMPENSATION SHOULD BE MADE.
The act of 1721 requires that compensation shall be made
"before such next builder shall in any wise use or break into the
said wall." Before using the wall therefQre the "next builder"
must make compensation."5 If he begins to use it before making
compensation, the continuance of the use may be enjoined at the
suitoftheowner of the party-wall until the compensation is made.20
A similar principle is embodied in the act of May 8th, 1872, with
respect to Pittsburg, which authorizes an injunction against the
use of the wall before the making of compensation .' Parties
may agree to erect a wall on the edge of their lots, A to erect the
first story, B, the second, and A and B the third. If, A building
"5Amer v Lnngstreth, io Pa. 145, Oat v. Middleton, 2 Miles, Geiss v.
Schadt, 14C. C. 177; Finley v. Stuebing, 38 Leg. Int., 386, [S. C.]; Norris
v. Adams 2 Miles, 337; Doyle v. Ritter, 6 Phila. 577; Milligan v. Baylie,
io Dist. 311. A different view is held by Finletter J. in McGittigan v.
Evans, 8 Phila. 264. A owning two lots and execting on one a house whose
eastern wall rested in part on the other lot, sold both lots to B. B con-
veyed the vacant lot to C. The court enjoined C. from using the wall un-
til hehad made compensation to B.
"Voight v. Wallace, 179 Pa. 5zo, Cf. Milligan v. Baylie, ix Dist. 311.
*SIngles v. Bringhurst, T Dall, 341. Miller's Appeal, 81 Pa. 54. Lu-
kens v. Lasher, so Dist. 385; McCall v. Barrie, r5 W. N. 28.
16Beaver v. Nutter, ,o Phila. 345; McGettigan v. Evans, 8 Phila. 264;
Oakes v. Senneff, 4 W. N. 413.
"Hoffstot v. Voight, ,46 Pa. 632.
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the first story of the wall, B refuses to build his part, A may
complete the wall, and by injunction prevent B's use of the wall
until he compensates A for the money spent in doing what B
contracted to do.'8 Nothing prevents B's paying A for the party-
wall, before B makes use of it; but, since the act of 1849, B would
have to pay again, on his using the wall, to any person to whom
A might have conveyed his lot and building, without reserving
tile right to the compensation.' 9
SUCCESSIVE USES.
As the second builder is required to compensate the first
builder for only so much of the wall as he uses, it follows that,
on the use of one part, a duty of making compensation will arise
for the use of that part. When, at some later time, another
part of the wall is used, there will again spring up the duty of
paying for this additional use, and so on.'0 If a wall, already
up is taken down by the owner of one of the lots because it is not
sufficient to support the new and larger building that he is about
to erect, the owner of the next lot makes the same use of the
new wall as he made of the old, without falling under a duty to
pay for it," but if at any time he increases the height or depth
of his building or erects in its stead, a higher or deeper building,
he will then become bound to pay for the use of the wall.
ASSUMPSIT TO ENFORCE PAYMENT.
If the use of the party-wall is made without prior giving of
compensation, the person entitled may bring an action of assump-
sit.2? In Ingles v. Bringhurst, -3 anindebitatus assumpsit, Shippen
J., said that "perhaps" [instead of suing in trespass] the plaintiff
might waive the trespass and bring an action on the implied
assumption, for money paid for the defendant's use." The
plaintiff failed in that case, because he had sued the grantee of the
person who had made the use of the wall.
TRESPASS.
The person who begins to use a party-wall before he has
acquired the right to use it by tendering compensation, is a tres-
'8Masson's Appeal, 70 Pa. 26.
"In Hart v. Rucher, 5 S. & R. I, payment was made 26 years before
the wall was used.
'0 Cf. Hoffstot v. Voight, 146 Pa. 632.
"Hoffstot v. Voight, 146 Pa. 632.
2"Fidelity Co. v. Haffner, 6 Super, 48; Wetherill v. Horan, 5 C. C. Igo;
Haines v. Drips, 2 Pars, Eq. 236; Voight v. Wallace, 179 Pa. 520.
2 Dall. 341.
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passer,24 and he can be sued as such. In Ritter v. Sieger 2 the
action of trespass quare clausurn fregit was sustained. It was
held that the defendant was liable not merely for the cutting of
holes in the wall, which did no serious injury, but for the further
use of the wall, for appropriating it to the use of the new build-
ing by building against it, which was a trespass of a permanent
character. If there are circumstances of aggravation, vindictive
damages may be recovered, but in their absence, the court properiy
confines the jury to compensation.
26
ON WHOM IS THE OBLIGATION.
The act of 1721 directs that the first builder "shall be reim-
bursed one moiety * * * or so much thereof as the next
builder shall have occasion to make use of before such next builder
shall in any wise use or break into the said wall." This language
puts on the "next builder" who uses or breaks into the wall, the
duty of making compensation. After the "next builder" has
erected his house, incorporating the party-wall into it, that wall
may be said to be used daily by him. or his tenant, or his grantee
But this use is not that which the statute cofntemplates. If, A and
B owning adjacent lots, A erects a party-wall over their division
line, and B subsequently incorporates the wall into a house which he
erects, and B's interest is sold by the sheriff or otherwise, to C,
who continues to use the house, this use does not make C liable
to the "first builder. '2 7  Passively enjoying the benefits of the
wall is not using it. Even an open lot is sheltered by the wall.
It serves to keep off trespassers. But for the owner of the Vacant
lot to suffer the benefit, does not compel him to pay for the wall.
2 8
Continuing an old use, is not a using which involves liability to
make compensation. If, e. g. a wall has already existed, which
has been incorporated into the houses of both A and B, and A,
2I4 ngles v, Bringhurst, i Dall. 341; Masson's Appeal 70 Pa. 26; Ritter
v. Sieger io 5 Pa. 400.
25xo5 Pa. 4oo.
261d; Amer v. Longstreth; zo Pa. '45.
"Lea v. Jones, 209 Pa. 22; Ingles v. Bringhurst; i Dall. 341; White v.
Snyder, 2 Miles, 395; Euwer v. Henderson, i Penny. 463.
28Wetherill v. Horan, s C. C. i9o; Thayer J. suggested that the use
must not be such in the "general sense" of that word. Otherwise, if the
owner of the vacant lot piled up boxes against the party-wall he would be-
come liable for compensation. The use must be for the support of a struc-
ture, a building. Heiland v. Cooper 38 W. N. 56o.
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finding the wall insufficient for a new building which he is about
to erect, removes it, and erects another, B has a right without
compensation to make the same use of this, as of the original wall.
Supporting in the new wall the beams of B's pre-existing building
in the same manner and to the same extent as they were supported
in the old, is merely the continuance of the old use.2 ' However, if
A tears down a wall [apparently it was wholly on the land of his
neighbor B] and erects a new wall, thicker, higher and longer
than the former, and after the completion of A's building, B tears
down his building, and erects one as large as A's, thus using all
the wall, he is bound to pay one-half of the value oi the wvhole
wall, because B would have been compelled to e, cct such a wall
had A not already erected it.
3 0
TRANSFER OF LIABILITY.
The owner of the lot, in the building upon which the party-
wall is used, is liable, although the contractor who is erecting it
has agreed to defray the cost of the wall. The contractor, in
using the wall, is his agent.31
ESTATE OF PERSON LIABLE.
The person who makes use of a party-wall, is usually the
owner in fee of the next lot. But a disseisor, having no other title
than his possession, would doubtless be liable. A lessee for a
term of years, may build the next house and use in so doing, the
party-wall, and become liable to make compensation.3 2  An agent
of the owner may probably become liable. The father of the
owner, erecting a house on the lot, inserts joists in the wall and
uses it otherwise. He would be liable. 3  The husband of the
owner of the vacant lot, if he causes the erection of a house there-
on, and the use of the party-wall, is personally liable for the com-
pensation.34
29Hoffstotv. Voight, 146 Pa. 632. Possibly if B instigates the tearing
down of the old wall and the building of a new, he will be liable at once to
pay for it, but simply making a suggestion after A has resolved to tear
down the wall which results in A sinking the new wall two feet deeper, will
not impose liability on B to pay for the same use of the new wall as of the
old.
2 Bailey's Appeal, i W. N. 35o. B also gained from the fact that the
new wall while 22 inches thick, projected only 6 1/2 inches upon B's lot.
The first builder may by contract preclude his receiving compensation from
the second builder; Shenk v. Pittsb. L. J. 464.
31Davids v. Harris o Pa. 5O.
32Fidelity Co. v. Hafner, 6 Super. 48.
33Ritter v. Sieger, 105 Pa. 400.
•4Davids v. Harris, 9 Pa. 501.
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TO WHOM THE COMPENSATION BELONGS.
The 2nd section of the act of Feb. 24th, 1721 enacts that
the "first builder [that is, the owner who erected the party-wall]
shall be reimbursed one moiety of the charge of such party-wall,
or for so much thereof as the next builder shall have occasion to
make use of," etc. This language justifies the interpretation
that the courts put upon it, and which held that only the "first
builder" could maintain a suit for the compensation, or was
entitled to recover it. His right did not pass to a grantee of the
house of which the wall was a part, unless it was expressly
assigned to such grantee.3 5 But, the right, like any other chose
in action, might be assigned by the "first builder." In 1858 Shars-
wood J., remarked that it was not uncommon in Philadelphia for
the "first builder" to agree with the contractor for the erection
of the house, that, as part of his compensation, the contractor
should have the right to receive compensation for the future use
of the party-wall. 86 But it is needless to say in the absence of
such an agreement, the contractor obtained no right to this
compensation.37 The contractor or other assignee of the right
would sue in the name of the assignor, the "first builder." 3s
To the grantee of the house might also be assigned the right to
compensation, before the act of April 10th, 1849.39
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION PASSES TO GRANTEE
The 4th section of the act of April 10th, 18494o enacted that
"In all conveyances of houses and buildings, the right to and com-
pensation for the party-wall built therewith, shall be taken to have
pissed to the purchaser, unless otherwise expressed, and the
owner of the house for the time being, shall have all the remedies
in respect to such party-wall as he might have in relation to the
house to which it is attached." Apparently, it was the intent of
the act to operate on conveyances made subsequent to its passage
sHart v. Kuchcr, 5 S. & R. i. Todd v. Stokes io Pa. 29. Dannaker
v. Riley, 14 Pa. 435; Pratt v. Meigs, 2 Pars. Eq. 302; Vollmer's Appeal. 61
Pa. ii.
3 Roberts v. Bye, 30 Pa. 375; Haines v. Drips, 2 Pars. Eq. 236; Todd v.
Stokes, io Pa. 155.
37Brierly v. Tudor, 2 Am. L. J. 191; King, P. J.; Eichert v. Wallace,
Am. L. J. 326.
33Roberts v. Bye, 30 Pa. 375; White v. Snyder, 2 Miles, 395,
89White v. Snyder, 2 Miles, 395.
"Mulligan v. Bayled, ii Dist. 311.
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Although, the first builder having conveyed prior to its passage,
the party-wall was not used by the owner of the next lot until
after its passage, the grantee had no right to the compensation.
It remained with the "first builder."'" A fortiori, if the use of
the wall by the next owner as well as the conveyance by the "first




The right to the compensation for a use yet to be made of the
wall passes with the conveyance by the first builder of the house
and lot. It passes when his interest is sold from him adversely
by the sheriff.43
WHEN RIGHT CEASES TO RUN WITH THE LAND.
The right to compensation runs with the lot and house of
which the party-wall was a part, so long as that right is immature;
that is, until a right to sue has arisen on account of an actual use
of the wall by the neighbor, but no longer. The matured right
to sue does not pass, unless it is expressly assigned to the grantee.
The adjoining owner uses the party-wall, Oct. 4th, 1901. The
"first builder" conveys his house Nov. 30th, 1901. The right to
recover the compensation for the use of the party-wall did not
pass to the grantee.4
ACT OF 1849 APPLIES TO CONTRACTUAL PARTY-WALLS.
The act of 1849 applies to walls whether they have been
erected adversely, or by an agreement, under which a rigbt to
compensation for their use arises. Thus, A, owning a piece of
land, on the east end of which was a brick building 20 feet wide,
built a warehouse against it to the west with side walls 22 inches
thick. He then conveyed to X the easterly part, with a width
of 20 feet and 11 inches thus including the ground on which the
eastern half of the eastern wall of the warehouse stood, the !eed
4'Bell v. Bronson T7 Pa. 363.
42Dannaker v. Riley, 14 Pa. 435. The act of 1849 was passed pending
an appeal from a judgment for the compensation for the use of the wall.
4sOats v. Middleton 2 Miles, 247. The right passes by an allotment in
partition of the land to one of several cotenants; Norris v. Adams, 2 Miles,
337.
"Lea v. Jones 209 Pa. 22 affirming 23 Super. 587 reversing ii Dist., 496
Cf. Enwer v. Henderson, t Penny. 463; Bloch v. Isham, 7 Am. L. Reg. N. S.
8; Ingles v. Bringhurst, i Dall. 341.
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however, stating that no use was to be made of this wall by X,
his heirs or assignees, until $1950.75, one-half of the cost of this
wall, should be paid to A, his heirs or assigns. Subsequently
A conveyed the warehouse lot, to the middle line of the eastern
wall to Z. The same year X conveyed to Z. Later Z used the
eastern wall of the warehouse. Z was under no duty to pay
$1950.75 to A. A's right to this money had passed by the con-
veyance to Z. Says Fell J., the wall became a party-wall by
agreement. By reserving the right to compensation, A and X
invested the wall "with the statutory incident of a party-wall."
The act of 1849 passed the right to the compensation to Z.4
RESERVATION OF THE RIGHT.
The act 1849 directs that the right to compen-aiion shall
pass, with the conveyance by the first builder or his successors
of the house containing the party-wall "unless otherwise ex-
pressed." The grantor may have already transferred the right
to compensation, before making the conveyance. He may, e. g.
in his contract with the builder for the erection of the houc.
have agreed that the builder shall have the right to rece,'e the
compensation for the future use of the wall. One who acquired
the house and party-wall with knowledge of this contract would
take subject to it; but one purchasing the house without knowledge
of it, would become entitled to the compensation, rather than the
builder. If A was the original owner of the house, and conveyed
it to B, who had notice of A's agreement with the contractor, and
B in turn conveyed it to C, who had no notice of that agreement,
the next user of the wall would have to compensate C.46 who
would have paid B for the house includinz the wall. B therefore
would be compelled to pay the contractor as for money received
by B to his use.47  As the party-wall is real estate, it seems to be
assumed that the right to compensation for its use is also real
estate.48 At least it is said that thesolemnities necessary to pass
an interest in land must be observed in reserving the right to the
compensation. A buys under a written agreement from B a lot,
and contracts with B, that B shall erect on it a house. The house
was built and the lot conveyed to A, without reservation of the
45Voight v. Wallace, 179 Pa. 520.
"Knight v. Beenken, 30 Pa. 372.
4'Roberts v. Bye, 30 Pa. 375.
"Wilson v. Demott, 15 Leg. Int. 270.
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party-wall. B erecting a house on the next lot, used the wall.
It would not be shown by B, that B had retained the right to com-
pensation for the party-wall, by proof that prior to and at the
time of his conveyance to A, A had admitted that B was to havw
the party-wall. When the first builder sells, properly reserving
the party-wall, he, and not his grantee is entitled to compensation
for its subsequent use, and he may enjoin the owner of the next
lot against that use until compensation is made49 or recover the
compensation by an appropriate action. If A in granting the
house to B, reserves the fight to compensation from the owner of
the next lot for the future use of the wall and in ignorance of
such reservation the latter pays for it to B, he may recover the
money thus paid from B.50
MERGER-COMPENSATION.
When after A erects a house, whose western wall is made
to stand in part on B's lot to the west, A acquires this western lot,
he does not destroy, it is said, his right to compensation for the
subsequent use of this wall by one to whom he later conveys the
western lot. A owns a lot with a house on it, whose west wall
is in part on the next lot. He subsequently acquires the next lot.
He then conveys the lot with the house on it, reserving the west
party-wall. Allison P. J., thought5 that he was entitled to com-
pensation from the grantee of the western lot, on his making use
of the party-wall. But, the grant of the western lot, according
to the cases just considered, made the grantee an owner of so much
"Beaver v. Nutter, io Phila. 345. In Thomas v. Saving Fund Co. 7
Dist. 375 A, having erected a house and party wall, conveys it to B, reserv-
ing the right to compensation for the wall. A then sold the next lot which
was vacant to X, with the right to use this wall. B conveyed his house
and lot to C who apparently had no notice of the reservation. During C's
ownership X made use of the wall. C had prior to concluding the purchase
obtained an insurance against liens and encumbrances. He could not re-
cover on the policy for his inability to recover the compensation. Why
C could not enforce the right to compensation does not appear.
'1McKibben v. Doyle, I73 Pa, 579.
51Beaver v. Nutter, io Phila. 345. While the right to the party wall was
reserved at the sale of the house, it does not appear that at the sale of the
vacant lot to the west, there was any reseryation of the right to use the
wall. In VanGunten v.:Parks, z5 W. N. 527 A erected a house with a party
wall. He then bought the next lot. The ownership of the firstlot passed to
X, and that of the other lot to Y. On Y's use of the wall, X could recover
compensation.
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of the wall as stood on it. Why then was he as owner, not entitled
to use it?
WALL ERECTED AT JOINT EXPENSE.
The owners of adjacent lots may agree, that one of them A,
shall erect a house, and that both shall pay for the party-wall.
If the payment is accordingly made, the subsequent use of the
party-wall by the owner of the vacant lot, would not oblige
him to make compensation. 2 The owner of two adjacent Icts in
Meadville agreed that A one of them should build the foundation
for a division wall; that the other B, should erect the wall upon
it to the height of 14 feet, that A should continue it 14 feet higher,
B paying 50 cents per thousand for the bricks used, and that the
3rd story part should be erected at their equal expense. A refus-
ing to build the second 14 feet of the wall B could complete the
wall, and restrain by injunction A from using the wall until he
had made compensation." In New Castle, A owning a lot, and
C the next of which B was tenant for a term of 20 years, the
three parties covenanted to erect a party-wall. C agreed that
whenever he should use it, he would pay, at the commencement
of his use, one-half of what the part of the wall so to be used, was
reasonably worth. The parties were to agree upon its worth, or if
that was not practicable, arbitration was to be resorted to. C
would be enjoined from using the wall, before having agreed with
A and B as to the worth of the part of the wall he was about to
use, or submitted the matter to arbitration. 5
MODE OF USE.
The affidavit of defense in a suit for compensation for use
of the party-wall, admitted that defendant used the wall, that the
roof erected by him is supported by light pieces of scantling, the
timbers or ends of which rest in small holes about two inches in
the wall, extending along the wall its whole length. This, said
Beaver J., "is a clear admission of such a use of the wall as makes
him liable. * * * The defendant's entire structure, at least
upon the one side, depended upon his own admission entirely upon
the party-wall."85 A owning one lot, B owned two adjacent lots
"Hart vs. Bucher, 5 S. & R. i.
53Masson's Appeal, 70 Pa. 26.
"Hileman v. Hoyt, 23 C. C. 533.
5IFidelity Co. v. Hafner, 6 Super. 48. The facts are not further stated
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contiguous to it. The middle lot was vacant. On it B erected
a frame structure, the roof of which covered the entire space
between the building on A's lot and that on B's lot. Thi., ro. f
rested on wooden frame work and supports, and against A's
building. A was held entitled to recover a moiety of that part of
the party-wall built by A, although there was no physical attach-
ment of B's structure and the wall. 6  Cutting into the party-wa'l
for the insertion of girders and lintels, is using it.57 Possibly
would plastering against it. 8 In Heiland v. Cooper"9 a suit for
use of a party-wall against B it was shown that B erected a
wooden shed 80 feet long, 14 feet high at the sides. It was
covered by a roof that extended from the party-wall of plaintiff
to the party-wall on the opposite side. The roof rested on a
wooden frame work, and on supports entirely on B's lot. The
shed was not enclosed on either side. The roof was covered with
felt. Plaintiff testified that it was fastened with pitch against
his wall. B testified that the shed was of no use to him and had
been erected to avoid a disput with the plaintiff about drainage.
He stated that the upright supports of the roof were one-half
inch from the wall; that the wall was not broken or used; that the
edge of the roof was not fastened to the-wall; that at a few
places, in applying pitch, the wall unintentionally became daubed,
and that the sky could be seen between the wall and the structure.
The court charged that, to make the defendant liable, he must
have used the wall for the 8upport of his building he must have
broken into the wall, or must have made use of it by some per-
manent physical attachment. The verdict being for the defendant
a new trial was refused.
ADDENDUM.
In Bright v. Morgan', A owned a house, whose west wall
was wholly on ot X. A also owned a strip 3 feet wide, west of
this wall, which was used for an alley. Later A conveyed the
strip to B, owner of the lot to the west. B in 1856 enlarged
the building on his lot causing it to stand over and embrace the
56Allen v. Cass, Stauffer Co., x Dist. 832. Facts not further given.
5'Retter v. Sieger, 105 Pa. 400.
'8Walsh v. Luburg, io C. C. 64t. The next owner sought to enjoin the
"first builder" from painting the wall, because, painted, it would not ad-
nere to the plaster. The court refused the injunction, thinking an action
for damages an adequate remedy. But compare Wistar v. Baptist Publi-
cation Society, 2 W. N. 333.
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three feet. In doing so, he *inserted joists into A's west wall,
and he also extended the wall vertically in making his building
four stories high. In 1905 the then owner of lot X, tore down
the building upon it, except the west wall, and erected another,
of which this wall became a part. In 1896 the then owner of the
lot to the west increased the height of the building on it, and
the height of the wall between it and X, and inserted and sup-
ported additional joists therein. There was no agreement
which gave B or his successors, the right to use this wall. It
was held, that the right to continue to use it as it had been used
between 1856 and 1896, was acquired by pfescription; but-that
no right to use it to any different extent was acquired. The
owner of X, filing a bill in 1905, not to compel the owner of the
adjacent lot to remove the additions made to the wall in 1896, but
to enjoin him against further aggressions, an injunction against
any future use of the wall in excess of the present use, was is-
sued. This case virtually asserts that a wall, which, when built
by the owner of the land on which it stands, and of adjacent
land, is not a party wall, does not become such, by the subse-
quent separation of the ownership of the land on which it stands,
from that of the land immediately contiguous to it; and that the
owner of such contiguous land has no right to use the wall with-
out the consent of its owner, and that the toleration of one use
of it, or even a second larger use of it; does not oblige the owner
to tolerate a still larger use of it. In Sharples v. Boldt A owned
a lot and B the next lot to the east. On A's lot was a building
with a party wall. B erected a building on his lot, but its west
side was 20 feet from the east side of A's lot, and therefore
made no use of the party wall. B however dug his cellar below
the line of the bottom of the party wall. In doing so, he owed
no duty but to dig his cellar with proper care. He presented
his plan to the Bureau of Building Inspection, which directed
him to underpin the party wall, and to increase the thickness
of the underpinning wall in proportion to the increased depth
of the cellar excavation. In building this wall, B built the un-
derpinning wall almost altogether on A's lot. It extended at
the top, 2 feet 2 inches beyond-the limit permitted by the act of
May 7th, 1855, and it increased in thickness downwards. The
east side of the underpinning wyall was vertical, and was 4 inches
west of the eastern vertical surface of the party wall. Except
1218 Pa. 178. '1i8 Pa. 372.
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5 inches, the whole of the underpinning wall is west of the centre
of the party-wall and is of the average depth of 30 feet. A by
bill asked for and obtained a decree that the underpinning wall,
so far as it existed for more than 10 inches in thickness on A's lot,
was a violation of his rights, and should be removed. The de-
cree was reversed. The building inspector did not prescribe
the extent of the invasion of A's lot, but as the underpinning
was for his benefit and not that of B, B could not be compelled
to put it on his own land. He could legitimately infer that it
was to be on A's. The additional thickness is no present det-
riment to A. It has become his, and he can do in the future
with it as he chooses. At most, B's act was a technical tres-
pass done under the supposed compulsion of law, i. e. of the
24th section of the act of May 5th, 18993.
3Mitchell C. J., proceeds to say that, under the evidence, the plaintiff
was not entitled to damages even nominal. But no decree for damages
was made in the court below. The weight of the evidence was that A knew
what B was doing and assented to it. That the plaintiff was the commit-
tee of a lunatic led to no different result from that which would have been
reached had the owner been suijuris.
MOOT COURT.
COMMONWEALTH vs. SHORTER.
Larceny of the Wife's Chattels by the Husband.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Shorter took and carried away the gold watch of his wife, with the
intention of depriving her thereof permanently.
CoLmiER, for the Commonwealth.
Where by statute the husband's interest in his wife's goods and chattels
is abolished, he may commit larceny by taking them. Beasley vs. State,
138 Ind. 552.
Coox, for the Defendant.
Statutes securing the property of married women to themselves do
not so 'far destroy the relation of husband and wife as to render either
guilty of larceny by converting the goods of the other. 18 A. & E. Enc.
of Law 512.
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EASTER, J-Larceny is the taking and removing by trespass, of the
personal property of another, which the trespasser knows to belong either
generally or specially to another, with the intent of depriving him of his
ownership therein.
At common law the husband and wife are regarded as one person and
the legal existence of the wife is merged into the husband. 18 A. & E.
Encyc., 790. 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 128.
In consequence of the intimate legal relationship created by marriage,
the wife or husband can never commit the trespass necessary in larceny,
by taking the husband's goods. 2 Bishop's Crim. Law, Sec. 855.
As a result of the marital relation the wife is generally unable to act
as a feme sole and the common law disabilities exist as to the person and
property of married women, except to the extent of changes by the legis-
lature in express terms or by reasonable construction. 15 A. & E. Encyc.,
790. Such statutes confer rights to make contracts, to make wills, acquire
and hold property, to be sole traders, to act as agent in a fiduciary capacity,
and to act sui juris.
At common law a husband could not commit larceny in respect to the
chattels of his wife, for the plain reason that all chattel property of a
woman vested, on her marriage, in her husband.
The power granted by modern statutes to acquire and hold property
as a feme sole, would seem to imply that the wife should have the same
rights in the protection of the same, by herself, as the feme sole.
It has been held that statutes securing the property of married women
to themselves do not, so far, abrogate the relation of husband and wife
as to render either guilty of larceny by converting the goods of the other.
18 A. & E. Encyc., 512.
There are statutes, which, in defining larceny, are so comprehensive as
to sever completely the unity of husband and wife and make it the crime
of larceny for a husband to take his wife's property, where a taking under
the same circumstances from' another person would be larceny.
The counsel for the Commonwealth argues that under the married
woman's act of June 8, 1893, P. L. 344, Sec. 1, "that the wife has such
rights over her separate property that the taking of it by the husband
would constitute larceny." The statute says she has the same right
to control her property as if unmarried and it would seem to imply that
she has entire control over it, but we cannot construe the statute to the
extent that it says, she may bring a charge against the husband so as to
maintain that the taking was larceny. We invoke the aid of the doctrine
which holds "that statutes securing the property of married women to
themselves do not so far destroy the relation of husband and wife as to
render either guilty of larceny by converting the goods of the other."
We come to the conclusion that the statutes of Pennsylvania do not so
far destroy the unity of husband and wife as to render either guilty of
larceny by the taking of and depriving the other of his property, notwith-
standing the statute gives her absolute power to control and dispose of her
property. The courts are adverse to the revoking of principles of law
that have been handed down from remote times to the present and sus-
tained by decisions of the courts.
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In Comm. vs. Hartnett, 3 Gray, (Mass.) 450, the defendant, who had
stolen an article from her husband, was adjudged to be guilty of simple
larceny, that is, for a theft, not aggravated by being taken from a person,
nor by being committed in a dwelling house or other building as prescribed
by their revised statutes and she was not liable for the punishment
of krceny therein described. In the same case it was decided that
the property stolen must be such as is usually under the protection of
the house, deposited therein for safe custody, and not things immediately
under the eye or personal care of some one who happens to be in the
house.
Manning vs. Manning, 79 N. C. 293, (65 L. R. A., 778) gave the wife
the right to have the rents and profits from her property which her hus-
band unlawfully withheld from her; they were not living together at the
time, as the husband was living with another woman, and the crime of
adulttry alone would sustain a conviction in this respect.
In Comm. vs. Jones, 61 L. R. A., 777, the court says, under code of
1883, that when the action concerns the wife's separate property she may
sue alone and may sue her husband in regard thereto. The wife would not
by rules of evidence be permitted to testify against her husband and her
testimony would be necessary to convict.
In summing up, we may say that there is no statute in Pennsylvania
which must be so construed that the husband can be held guilty of larceny
of his wife's personal property. The legal unity of husband and wife
has been severed to a great extent but not to the extent that the husband
will be convicted.
The rule and laws adopted in codes of other states do not apply in
this state.
Jfidgment arrested.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
That a wife could not at common law steal the property of her hus-
band seems to have been well established; 25 Cyc.31; 1Wharton Crim. Law,
798; State v. Banks, 48 Ind. 197. The reason assigned is not always the
same. It is sometimes said to be that"they are but one person." 1 Whar-
ton, 798; Hawkins P. C. 1 lib. ch. 33, sect. 32. At other times that "the
husband by endowing his wife at the marriage with all of his worldly
goods, gives her a kind of interest in them." Hawkins, P. C. ibid. Lord
Campbell also says that the wife has a "property in her husband's goods."
Regina v. Featherstone, Dearsly, 369. In Com. v. Hartnett, 3 Gray, 450,
it was said that the heavier penalty for stealing in a building, could not be
imposed on a woman who stole the goods of X in the building of her
husband, for her husband's building "is the same as her own." Of course,
if they are one person, neither can steal from, the other, for so to do
implies duality. Neither could kill, or assault the other, or libel the other,
or burn the property of the other; the husband could not be accessary to
a rape upon the wife, etc., etc. Some of these conclusions from the con-
ception of unity have been drawn, while others haye been illogically
declined. An amusing instance of the willingness of judges to cite the
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prin.'iple, as if it had a meaning and at the same time to reject it, is that
of Lord Campbell who, in Regina v. Featherstone, Dearsly, 369, after saying
that the wife could not steal her husband's goods on "the principle" that
the husband and wife are, in the eye of the law, one person, adds "but this
rule is properly and reasonably qualified when she becomes an adulteress.
She thereby determines her quality of wife, and her property in her
husband's goods ceases." But can she indeed, recover her existence lost
in that of the husband by an act of adultery? Only the law by divorce
can effect that miracle of revitalization and resurrection. Indeed how a
woman who has ceased to exist, can commit adultery, is one of the
marvels of the metaphysics of the mediaeval law. In Lamphier v. State,
70 Ind. 317, the suggestion is made that the wife, living with the husband,
has possession of his goods by reason of the marriage relation, and
hence, cannot steal them; since stealing involves the unlawful gaining of
the possession.
Modem legislation has diminished the rights of the husband over the
wife's property; but not hers over his. He must still support her. He
still "endows" her with his goods in making a contract of marriage. Per-
haps we are warranted in saying that a wife is still unable to steal the
property of her husband.
The question immediately before us is can a husband steal the personal
property of the wife which is in her possession, of which he, without
her consent, deprives her of the possession, with the intention to deprive
her permanently of it.
He might think, from the relation between himself and her,
that what was hers was his. His taking would then not be animvo
furandi. 'But we are to assume that he harbors no s'uch mistake. He
knows that what he is taking is hers not his and that he is doing a wrong
act in taking it, and that every fact exists which would make his act a lar-
ceny unless the relation alone of husband to wife precludes his larceny of
her chattels.
At common law, the husband could not commit larceny of his wife's
goods.. A sufficient reason was that the wife had no goods. What she
had at the time of marriage, had become his and ceased to be hers.
What fell to her after marriage, passed instantaneously from her to him.
An absurd reason was invented for this transmission of the wife's owner-
ship to the husband. "This depends" says Blackstone, 2 Comm. 433,
"entirely on the notion of the unity of person between husband and wife;
it being held that they are one person in law, so that the entire being and
existence of the woman is suspended during coverture or entirely merged,
incorporated in that of the husband." If this were so, she could not be
murdered except in the murder of the husband. A rape upon her, was
impossible for she had become he. She could -no more own land than
chattels; and the fee in land, which she formerly had, would be his, not
hers. She could not be divorced except by the mutilation of the one
person, who was the husband. But the law did not consistently ignore the
sepai ate existence of the wife. She could be murdered, even by her
husband, and he could be punished for the act, that is, in killing her ie
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killed a part of himself, and to avenge the wrong, the state or kingdom
killed the other part. The husband could even be an accessary before
the fact to the rape of his wife. In short, the conception of unity was
artificial: logically applied, it would have led to absurd and abhorrent
results. It was therefore invoked sometimes and sometimes defied.
The modern law has still further broken away from this conception.
Its chief corollory at common law was that the wife's property because
the kusband's. This principle is now wholly abandoned. The wife now
has the same right and power -as an unmarried person to acquire, own,
possrss, control, use, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of any property of any
kind Act June 8th, 1893, P. L. 344. Marriage does not draw the owner-
ship away from the woman and deposit it in the man. The great reason
then for holding a husband incapable of committing larceny with respect
to the wife, has disappeared; she has property, as if unmarried. No inter-
est therein vests in the husband. He has the physical power to take it
out of her possession. He can as well intend to permanently deprive
her of it as to so deprive any other person. He can know the law, and
therefore know that the relation of husband does not entitle him in the
least to interfere with her property. Why then should an exception in
his favor, an exemption from criminal liability be invented? We say
invented, for it has not yet existed. The time never was in the history
of English law that if a husband stole the property of his wife he should
not be deemed a thief. Formerly the law made it impossible for a woman
to own property. It followed, of course, since there was no property there
could be no theft of it. But if, the wife now owning property, it cannot
be criminally taken by the husband, it must be for some reason not yet
recognized as valid.
The principle of the unity of the husband and wife exhausted itself
when it made impossible the wife's ownership of chattels.
It is true that the wife has not yet all the remedies for vindicating
her ownership against the husband, that she would have against another
pers(-n. Unless she is deserted by him, she can probably maintain no
common law action against him .for it. She cannot support her right as
against him by her testimony. But, criminal prosecutions are in the name
of the state. The state is interested in the prevention of thefts. It
furnishes a machinery for their repression. It would largely nullify the
policy of the act of 1893, which preserves for a wife her property if, even
when taken by the husband selfishly, cruelly, neither she can recover it or
damages for the taking, nor does the state hold a penal liability in terrorem
over him.
In several states whose legislation resembles that of Pennsylvania,
it is held that a husband may be guilty of larceny of the wife's goods.
Beasly v. State, 138 Ind. 552; Hunt v. State of Arkansas, 65 L. R. A. 71.
In England, says A Century of Law Reform, England, 1901, "The married
woman's property act, 1882, has for the first time brought within the
reaci, of the criminal law a husband who, in the act of deserting his wife,
steajs her separate property, and a wife can in similar circumstances be
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prosecuted for stealing her husband's property. This would, of course,
have been impossible at common law." Whether it would have been
supposed in England, that notwithstanding the recent enlargement of the
property rights of a wife her chattels could have been taken by the hus-
band without any criminal liability but for the provision referred to, which
reshicts that liability to cases of desertion, does not appear. We have no
such statutory provision here. We think a sound policy requires that the
property rights of the wife shall not be nearly wholly defenseless, as they
wouk, be if the husband were liable neither civilly nor criminally for
improperly and fraudulently taking the wife's chattels.
'i he question has not been considered in Pennsylvania. In Common-
wealth v. Levinson, 34 Super. 286, it might have been but was not. In some
states a result different from the one reached by us, has been announced,
25 Cyc. 31. In Thomas v. Thomas, 51111. 162, a proceeding by the husband
for divorce, one of the grounds of divorce alleged was the commission by
the wife of the larceny of a watch. Whose watch it was, did not distinctly
appear. If the watch was the husband's, the court says, the taking of it
"would not even under that law [the act of 1861] be held larceny. That
act has not so far destroyed the relation of husband and wife as to render
either guilty of larceny by converting the property of the other." But,
the provisions of the act of 1861 are not given, and as the court proceeds
to state, it was not the commission of a felony, but the conviction of it,
that justified a divorce under the law, and the wife had not been convicted
of any larceny.
We are obliged therefore to reach a conclusion different from that
attained by the learned court below.
The record is remanded with direction to the court below to enter
judgment on the verdict.
SARAH ORLOFF vs. JNO. TAVOLVISK.
Base Fee-Conditional Limitation-Remarriage of Widow.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Orloff devised to his wife, the plaintiff, his house and lot, by
thest words: "I give my house and lot to my wife and her heirs, unless
she .-hall marry again. If she marries, I give them to my brother Jacob
and his heirs." Not having remarried, the plaintiff, twenty years after
her husband's death, contracts to convey to the defendant for $6000.
Defendant, doubting the title, refuses to accept it. Having tendered the
deed, plaintiff brings this action.
HOWER, for the Plaintiff.
KING, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BRANCH, J.-The phrase "to my wife and her heirs," creates a fee
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in th i wife. This, however, is followed by, "unless she shall marry again."
This proviso makes her estate one on condition, so it is what is known in
the law as a base fee. See Tiedeman on Real Property, 3rd ed., Chap. x.
By the same authority it is not an estate on limitation; but the devise over
is a conditional limitation, sec. 211; and it takes effect as an executory de-
vise. See Tiedeman, chap. xv.
Counsel, in their briefs, contend altogether with respect to the nature
of the estate granted and to the validity or invalidity of the condition
attached to Mrs. Orloff's estate; so a reference to the latter may not be
amiss. By the civil law all restraints upon marriage were invalid; and
Chief Justice Gibson ascribes this to the fact that "the Romans were
driven by waste of life in their ceaseless wars * * * to force the
growth of the population by concubinage as well as marriage, and by the
imposition of a mulct upon celibacy." At an early date, in England, the
-ecclesiastical courts had sole control of legacies; so, as they had adopted
the civil law, all restraints upon marriage were illegal and void as to
gifts of personalty. Gradually the rigor of this rule has been relaxed until,
in England and in this country, when personalty is bequeathed on limita-
tion or on condition with limitation over on marriage, the legatee takes
an estate during widowhood. But when personalty is bequeathed on con-
dition subsequent against marriage the condition is invalid. Vide opinion
of Mitchell, C. J., in Holbroke's Estate, 213 Pa., 93. But such a condition
is valid if there is but a restraint against marriage with a certain person or.
a class of persons or if the restraint is reasonable as to time. Those
interested should see the argument of Mr. Hare in M'Ilvaine vs. Gethen,
3 Wharton 575, and Gibson's opinion in Comm. vs. Stauffer, 10 Pa. 350.
But the civil law rule has never applied to devises, so the condition in this
case is valid and on the marriage of Mrs. Orloff her estate ceases. Comm.
vs. Stauffer, 10 Pa. 350; Lancaster vs. blowers, 198 Pa. 614; Scott vs.
Murry, 213 Pa. 186; and Redding vs. Rice, 171 Pa. 301.
While not mentioned in the briefs, a question has been raised as to the
Statute of Frauds. That statute created a rule of evidence; but it has
been waived here by the person to be charged, the defendant. He is in
cou-t admitting that the contract was made, but that he doubts the title.
Mrs. Orloff, having tendered the deed, is in a position to get judgment
for the purchase money, unless her title is not what it should have been;
and that raises the principal point in this case, although not touched upon
by counsel. Plaintiff has contracted to convey. What? That does not
affirmatively appear. It may have been her interest or it may have been
the title. In the absence of anything to the contrary, we must assume
that it was the latter. When we contract to convey the title, the law
assumes that we have contracted to convey a fee simple. See Burk vs.
Bear. 3 Clark 355; Leslie vs. Morris, 9 Phila. 110; Jones vs. Gardner, 10
John.-. 266.
Courts of law inquire whether the title is good or bad, so that, had
Mrs. Orloff, having a good title, brought this action at common law, there
is no doubt but that she could recover. But in this state equity is part of
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the law, and as this is essentially an action for specific performance, this
case must be decided on equitable principles. What these principles are
will be seen from the following expressions: "But the equity doctrine is,
that a title is not to be forced upon a purchaser, which is not so free from
difficulty as to law or fact, that on a resale an unwilling purchaser shall
be unable to raise any question, which may appear to a judge sitting in
equity, so doubtful, that a title involving it ought not to be enforced."
Nicol vs. Carr, 35 Pa. 381. "If there be color of an outstanding title which
may prove substantial, though there is not enough in evidence to enable
the chancellor to say so, a purchaser will not be held to take it and en-
counter the hazard of litigation with an adverse claimant," per Sterrett,
C. J., in Bately vs. Foerderer, 168 Pa. 350. "A decree of specific perfor-
mace is of grace, not of right. It will never be made in favor of a vendor,
unless he is able to offer a title marketable beyond a reasonable doubt,
nor against a vendee where he is able to show any circumstances which
would make it unconscionable to do so," per Paxson, J., in Mitchell vs.
Steinmetz, 97 Pa. 251. See also Holmes vs. Woods, 168 Pa. 530; Dazell
vs. Crawford, 1 Pars. Eq. 45; and Stoddart vs. Smith, 5 Binn. 365.
While the cases in which these expressions were made were cases in which
that which made the title doubtful was already in existence, as where the
title is derived under partition proceedings, the legality of which is ques-
tioned, or under tax sale, nevertheless reasons as potent exist here.
If we find for the plaintiff, we force on Tavolvisk a title which is liable
to be divested at any time until Mrs. Orloff dies without having had a
second husband. It is a title which may involve him in litigation, for
Jacol, Or:off is very likely to assert his title on Mrs. Orloff's marriage.
During her life, any man of ordinary prudence would hesitate to accept
the title from Tavolvisk, and this justifies any court in refusing to enforce
the ontract. As we have said, Mrs. Orloff's interest is a base fee, and
Jacob Orloff has a contingent interest, so the case is as strong as that of
Jones vs. Gardner, supra, a case where, with a contingent interest out-
standing, there was held to be no clear and absolute title.
Judgment is accordingly entered for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The able opinion of the learned court below makes an extended dis-
cuss;on by us unnecessary. As that court has said, the devise confers a fee
upon Mrs. Orloff, but a fee subject to defeasance, should she remarry.
This condition subsequent is valid. Mrs. Orloff has not remarried al-
though 20 years have elapsed since her husband's death. What her pres-
ent age is does not appear. It matters not, except as it might lessen the
probability of a remarriage. But, probable or not, remarriage remains
possible throughout her whole life. One who obtained a conveyance
from her, would take the land subject to the risk of loss of it by her
second marriage. The contract of Tavolvisk was for a good fee absolute.
He cannot be compelled to accept, and pay for any other fee.
'udgment affirmed.
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HAND vs. SCOTT.
Replevln-Tender of the Vendor's own Promissory Note as part
Payment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Scott purchased a horse from Long for $150. Long received $50 and
took Scott's note payable in 30 days. The horse was delivered to Scott,
but Scott failed to pay the note when due. Hand purchased the overdue
note for $95. He then offered Scott $155 for the horse and Scott accepted
the offer. He then tendered Scott $55 in cash and the $100 note but Scott
declined to deliver. Continuing the above tender, Hand brings replevin
for the horse.
DAY for the plaintiff.-Bush vs. Bender, -3 Pa. 94, and Welsh vs.
Bell, 32 Pa. 12.
HEss for the Defendant.
HOWER, J.-This was an action of replevin brought by Hand against
Scott to recover a horse which the former had bought from the latter.
"To replevy is when a person distrained upon applies to the sheriff or
his officers and has the distress returned into his possession." 3 Bl. 1?
But instead of confining the use of this writ to the recovery of property
held by the landlord for rent arrears, its use has been extended and, in
some of the United States, it is allowed and used as a remedy whenever
one man claims goods in the possession of another and seeks to recover
them specifically. Weaver vs. Lawrence, 1 Dall. 156. Therefore, this
actior. will lie if the goods belong to Hand. Miller v. Warden, 111 Pa. 300.
But let us notice the transaction between Scott and Hand. Hand
contracted with Scott for the horse and the consideration agreed upon was
$155. There was nothing said as to how it should be paid. Hand now
tenders $55 in cash and Scott's note for $100 which he had given to Long
in part payment for the horse and which was now overdue. Scott refused
to deliver the horse. When no agreement was entered into to the con-
trary, cash is understood. Welsh vs. Bell, 32 Pa. 12; also lower court's
charge in Bush v. Bender, 113 Pa. 94, which was approved by the Supreme
Court.
If the seller understood it to be a sale for cash and the buyer under-
stood it to be in payment of a debt, the minds of the parties did not meet
and there was no agreement or contract of sale. Wabash vs. Bank, 23
Oh. 311. Therefore replevin will not lie since there was no binding sale.
However, Hand contends that Scott's note for $100 was a valid tender
of the balance of the debt; and we agree if there had been such a contract
entered into by which the creditor's note was to be a part of the purchase
price, then the tender would have been a proper one and replevin would
lie. But intention or agreement to take the note must be shown, which
was not done in this case. Kemp v. Watt, 15 Mees. & W. 672. And with-
out such an agreement the tender of a creditor's own promissory note
then due or overdue is insufficient. Am. and Eng. Ency. vol. 28, page 26.
Hamer v. Fisher, 58 Pa. 453; Bush v. Bender, 113 Pa. 94. It has been
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held in Windle vs. Moore, No. 2, 1 Chester Co. 409, that in an ordinary
purchase it is implied that the price shall be paid in money at the time
of delivery of the goods and when the vendee refuses to pay money and
tenders in payment a note of the vendor to a third person this constitutes
a fraud upon the vendor.
Hand had purchased this overdue note from Long and by so doing
must now collect it from Scott but that is another matter. Because he
bought the note is no reason why.he should perpetrate a fraud upon the
defendant. As was said in Bush v. -Bender, supra, "The ingenious device
to which he resorted to compel the application of the value of the horses
on the notes which he. held against the other party, cannot receive the
sanction of law."
Therefore, the vendor may refuse to deliver without payment. Ward
v. Shaw, 7 Wend. 404; and as long as something remains to be done by
the vendee, he cannot maintain replevin. Strong & Co. v. Dinning et. al.,
175 Pa. 586.
Judgment accordingly for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The sale by Scott to Hand was for $155. Nothing was said indicating
that the ownership was to pass prior to the tender of the payment.- The
transfer of ownership was therefore conditional on such tender. If the
tender actually made was such as Scott was bound to accept, the estate
passed with it; Hand became the owner, and could enforce his ownership
by means of the action of replevin. Tiffany Sales, 365.
Was Scott bound to accept the things tendefed? He owned the horse,
and could retain it -or not, as he chose. The fact that he was in debt; or
that he was in debt for it, did not restrain this power. He could have sold
it back to Long, or -he could have sold it to Hand, in payment of the price
which he had .agreed to pay to Long but had not yet paid. He has not
chosen to do this. Neither Long nor Hand could have lawfully taken
the horse for payment of his claim without Scott's consent, except by
means of an execution sale.
The sole question then is, did Scott, when he made the contract to
sell the horse to Hand for $155 mean, and did Hand understand him to
mean, $155 in money? There can not be. two opinions as to the prope.
answer. One hundred and fifty-five dollars does not mean $55, and a note
of some one, even of the vendor's own making, for $100. Hand had
ingeniously contrived a plan whici he supposed would procure for him
the horse and thus pay the note of Scott, without Scott's assent to such
payment. But a man cannot thus lose his property without his own co-
operation, even when the loss of it would not be without compensation
to him, in that a debt which he owes, would be thus extinguished. The
case- of Windie v. Moore, No. 2, "1 Chest. 409, cited by the learned court
below, is very similar to the case before us. The vendee refused to give
back the horse, when the vendor declined to take his (the vendor's) own note
in payment, and the vendor was permitted to recover the value of the
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horse, as damages in an action of trover and conversion. In Bush v.
Bender, 113 Pa. 94, the horses, ritained by the vendee under like circum-
stances, were recovered by the vendor in an action of replevin




Kidnapping-Murder of Second Degree.
The fcts are stated in the opinion of the court.
BELL for the Commonwealth.
Kidnapping is a felony in Pa. Act Feb. 25, 1875, P. L. 4.
BRUcE, for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BROWN, J.-According to the facts of the case Brown was engaged
in kidnapping a child with intent to extort money for the child's restora-
tion. He, finding that it was necessary to subdue the child by force, ap-
plied such force as was necessary to accomplish his intention. Although
the force used was not such as would' ordinarily cause death or great
bodil; harm, the child died as a result thereof.
The question in this case seems to be whether Brown is guilty of the
homicide which resulted from the commission of the crime above stated.
It is very evident that the defendant is not guilty of murder in the
first degree, as the statutory definition of first degree murder does not
include the crime of kidnapping. Then also this was not a deliberate
and premeditated killing. Penna. vs. Lewis, Addison 278.
We do think however that Brown is guilty of second degree murder
and in order to show this we will have to take three successive and dis-
tinct've steps.
First, by the 1st section of the Act of April 4, 1901, it is declared a
felony for any person to take or carry away, or decoy or entice away,
or secrete any child or person, with intent to extort money or any other
valuable thing for the restoration or return of such person." There is
no doubt that this case is embodied in the statute first quoted and there-
fore is a felony.
Our second step is to show that the defendant is guilty of the crime
resulting from the perpetration of this felony. By the doctrine of con-
structive intent, where a person acting with a view to the commission of
a felony commits another criminal act which he did not intend, he is
criminally responsible for the resulting criminal act. Clark's Criminal
Law pages 54 and 191.
Now that we have shown the defendant guilty of the resulting crime,
we will show that the crime is murder and that the defendant is punish-
able for murder in the second degree. It is also stated on page 191 of
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Clark's Crimin'al Law, that when the resulting crime is homicide the
offender is guilty of murder. At common law, homicides might be mur-
der, though those who committed them had no intention either to kill or
cause grave bodily harm. Trickett's Criminal Law, vol. 2, page 819.
Since we have shown the resulting crime to be murder it must be
murder of the second degree as shown in the first part of this opinion.
We might say incidentally, that the fact that the force employed -by
Brown was not such as would ordinarily cause death or great bodily
harm has no weight in the case. The fact that the act committed was a
felony is sufficient. Of course if this had been Brown's intention it would
have strengthened the case and perhaps made him guilty of murder in
the first degree. But since this fact was unknown to him, we canbot see
where it adds any force whatever.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The learned court below has concluded that Brown cannot be con-
victed of murder of the first degree. The death of his victim was not
intended by him, nor was it the result of the perpetration of a rape, rob-
bery, burglary or arson. If murder at all, it is murder of the second
degree.
At common law "the state of mind involved in the attempt to com-
mit a felony (any felony) constitutes malice aforethought (implied), so
that death resulting, although entirely unintended, will be murder."
1 McClain, Crim. Law, 294.
The attempt has been made in recent times, to qualify this doctrine so
as to require that the death should be "naturally consequent upon the
felony committed." 1 McClain Crim. Law, 295, and Wharton has stig-
matized as "incompatible" "both with logic and with humanity" the
doctrine that a man is guilty of Miurder, who causes the death of another,
while doing an act which is defined as a felony, although it would not
probably result in death or serious bodily harm to another. He asserts
that "if a man should now be tried for a homicide which, though conse-
quent on killing a tame foul [in the effort to steal it] was not only unin-
tended by the defendant but was in no way a natu'ral or probable result"
be would be held guilty only of manslaughter. 1 Wharton Crim. Law, 345.
He concedes however that the common law rule was that a killing incident
to a felony, whether intended or not, whether foreseeable as not unlikely
or not, was murder. We see no sufficient reason for rejecting this rule.
The statute law of Pennsylvania makes a killing which is incidental
to a rape, an arson, a robbery, a burglary, a capital offence, whether the
doer had or not reason for suspecting that death might ensue. Arson
and the other three felonies can be committed by one who firmly believes
that injury to a human being will not, cannot follow. If death in fact
follows, he is responsible as for a murder.
If then responsibility as for murder, follows in a death produced by
one of these four felonies, without regard.to its anticipableness, its likeli-
hood why should the" anticipabfeness of the death be itisited on, in the
case of a felony of another class?
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Even if we adopt the principle that only acts of a high -turpitude,
followed by death, should involve the doer in the guilt of murder, that
high turpitude is visible in the act of the accused. That act is looked
on by the legislature as extremely base and as needing severe punishment
for its repression. It can be punished by an imprisonment of 20 years.
Murder of the second degree receives a like punishment. What more
base and atrocious, than to kidnap a child, deprive it of the society of its
parents and friends, expose it to abuses of various sorts, at the hands
of vile persons, and thus to treat it, for the purpose of extorting money
from the anguished love of its friends?
Kidnapping was not a felony at common law, and it is suggested that
when the early judges laid down the principle' that a killing resulting
from the commission of a felony was murder, they had in mind the
felories then recognized. They doubtless had such felonies in mind. It
would not follow that they would have said, had a statute-made felony
been brought to their attention, that the principle would not extend to
such a felony. (State v. Smith, 32 Me. 369. People v. Enoch, 13 Wend.
159), although crimes of small as well as of great gravity and turpitude
being classed as felony, by reason of the place e. g. a state penitentiary,
in which the imprisonment is to be suffered, the court might refuse to
extend to such of them as were of small gravity the principle that an
ensuing death would make the perpetrator a murderer. Cf. Powers v.
Commonwealth, (Ky.) 61 S. W. 735.
The kidnapping was not merely a felony. It was a felony of grave
turpitude. Its perpetration implied great hardness of heart, towards the
victim and its friends, and a repulsive sordidness. We promote the ob-
ject of jurisprudence by holding that one who, in committing the abduc-
tion kills he child is guilty of the murder of it, whether he niight have
or ought to have, forseen 'that death would probably result or not.
Judgment affirmed.
WILLIAM IPPLE vs. JOHN SEBAISTION.
Assumpslt-uarantor or Surety not Liable where a new Note Is
given.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Hipple loaned $2000.00 to Templeton on Templeton's presenting to him
a paper executed by Sebastion, reading thus, 'If William Hipple loans
$2000.00 to Jared Templeton on his promissory note, I will pay that note,
if it shall not be paid when it falls due." When the note fell due Tem-
pleton begged for time, Hipple agreed to accept a new note for the
$2000.00 payable sixty days after date, and to deliver up the first note.
The old note was given up and the new note executed. -When the new
note fell due, it was not paid. Assumpsit on Sebastion's contract.
FETTzRHoo', for the Plaintiff.
KING, for the Defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.
WOODWARD, J-We are clearly of the opinion that the plaintiff
is not entitled to recover in this action. This is an action upon a con-
tracE of guarantee, for Sebastion was a guarantor, and not a surety, as
conten~ded by the learned counsel for the defendant. Bouv. Law Diction-
ary page, -; Reigart v. White, 52 Pa. 440; Woods v. Sherman, et al.,
71 Pa.,100; Riddle v. Thompson, 104 Pa. 330; Mizner v. Spier, 96 Pa..533.
Were we disposed to rest on the technicality we might give judgment
for the defendant in this instance because the facts do not show that he
was ever notified by William, Hipple that. the offer to guarantee payment
of Templeton's note had been accepted or acted upon. It seems to be
well setled that where there is an offer of guarantee, in order. that the
guarantor may become liable thereon there must have been sufficient
notice to the proposed guarantor that his offer had been accepted and
relied upon. "Where there is a mere offer to guarantee, notice of. accep-
tance is requisite, and notice of acceptance will not be presumed,. in the
absence of evidence, however probable the- fact of knowledge of such
acceptance may be! ' Patterson v. Reed, 7 W. & S. 144; Coe et al. v.
Richmond, 110 Pa. 367; Evans & Co. v. McCormick, 167 Pa. 247; Unangst
v. Hibler, 26 Pa. 150; Kellog v. Stockton, 29 Pa. 460..
But we are disposed to rest our decision. upon the. broader ground
that Hipple in extending time to Templeton, in accepting the. new. note,
and surrendering the original one,. consummated a new contract, to which
Sebastion was. in no way a party. The law is, uniformly jealous of. the
interests of both sureties and guarantors, and we feel that it would be
extending.the liability of a guarantor entirely too. far to require him to
pay a defaulted note, of. which he had no notice, and against which he
had no- means of guarding himself, because of such lack of -knowledge.
"Yet such a guarantor is a species of surety; and is discharged from
his liability if the creditor did, by a subsequent valid contract give time
to the principal." Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243.
'W'hen the terms of a contract have been varied without his consent,
it ig prima facie, but not conclusive evidence of injury, and the effect
is to throw the onus probandi on the creditor; who is. bound to prove
thai, notwithstanding the change in the terms of the agreement, no injury
resulted to the guarantor." Fullmer v. Dale, 9 Pa. 85.
"The contract of a guarantor, in general, is to be construed strictly
in his own favor, and any variation from the exact liability assumed by.
him will amount to a discharge." Randolph on Com. Paper 1318.
Therefore the acceptance of the new note, and surrender of the old,
coristituted a payment and satisfaction of the note on which Sebastion
was liable as guarantor, and he is not liable now for the money which
was voluntarily loaned by Hipple on the strength of the new note from
Templeton. 7 Cyc. 1011; Cake v. Leb. First Nat. Bank, 86 Pa. 303.
And we direct judgment to be entered for the defendant, and that the
plaintiff pay the costs of this action.
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OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The note of Templeton, was at maturity surrendered to him by the
payez-, Hipple, who, instead of it, accepted a new note. From these acts,
the extinction, the payment, of the first note might legitimately be in-
ferred. Sebastion's engagement was to pay "that note" if it should not
be paid when it fell due. Payment may be by any means which the
creditor chooses to accept; namely, goods, land, other secureties for the
payment of money. Hipple chose to accept a second note, as a substitute
for the first. The first note having been thus paid, no duty remained 'on
the part of Sebastion.
The learned court below has treated Sebastion's undertaking as a
guaranty. In the stricter sense a guarantee is an undertaking to pay the
money, if the primary debtor does not pay and further if he is insolvent,
so that the creditor cannot obtain payment by timely suit. In this sense,
Sebastion is more than a guarantor. He promises to pay the note "if it
shall not be paid when it falls due." He could be sued instantly upon
the maturity of the note, were it-not then paid, whether Templeton was
solvent or insolvent; whether from Templeton payment could by action
have been secured or not. His liability is indistinguishable from that of
a surety. Cf. Campbell v. Baker, 46 Pa. 243.
But, whether surety or guarantor, Sebastion had-a right to pay
Hipple, on the maturing of the note, and to sue Templeton instantly for
reimbursement. With this right Hipple cannot properly interfere. He has
interfered with it, by postponing his own right to sue on the note, even
if he has not extinguished that note. He has bound himself to extend
the time until the maturity of the second note. If Sebastion chose to pay
Hipple before that time, he would have no right to sue Templeton until
the lapse of the period of the second note. During the longer time, the
financial state of Templeton might undergo deterioration; the risk of
which Sebastion would have been, if consulted, unwilling to undergo. This
prolongation by Hipple of Templeton's time for payment, would dis-
charge Sebastion, even if the first note had not been discharged. Camp-
bell v. Baker, supra.
The learned Court below has found that the offer of Sebastion being
a guaranty, Hipple should have informed him betimes, that it had been
accepted and acted upon by a loan of the money to Templeton. It matters,
not, we think, whether we term Sebastion's offer that of suretyship or of
guaranty. Hipple had not bound himself to make the loan. He might
not make it. Knowledge that he had made it, in reliance on Sebastion's
offer, might have been useful to the latter, just as useful, if a surety as
if a guarantor. Failure to give the notice, reasonably promptly, after
acting upon the offer (if notice of the intention to act upon it had not
been given) would discharge Sebastion. Acme Mfg. Co. v. Reed, 127 Pa.
359. Quod non apparet non est. It is not shown that notice was given
to Sebastion. Notice, then, was not given to him. For this reason, as
the learned court below has decided, there can be no recovery.
judgment affirmed.
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WILLIAM WALES vs. JOHN JANEIRO.
Replevin-Cash Sale-Waiver of Cash Payment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Wales sold a bicycle to Janeiro for $zO cash, and sent it by a boy to
the house of the latter with directions not to leave it, unless he got the
money. Janeiro paid the boy $40 and said he would pay the rest in
3 days. Wales, disappointed, sent a note at once demanding a return of
the bicycle, and tendering the $40. To this Janeiro said he would call in
2 days and pay. A week elapsed when Wales sending back the $40,
began this replevin for the wheel which Janeiro in the meantime, had
been daily using.
CooK, for the Plaintiff.
JONES, C. A., for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
CARL, J.-The conditions under which Wales may bring an action
of replevin to recover the specific property in this case are that he must
show title general or special to be in him and that he has the right of
possession. We think he lacks these requisites.
In the contract of sale the stipulation as to cash payment is a condi-
tion precedent and title to the property will not pass prior to delivery
until this condition either has been complied with or waived. If the
goods are delivered the presumption is that the condition is waived.
In some cases it is even held that title actually pases and not that there
is a mere presumption of waiver. (Welsh v. Bell, 32 Pa. 17; Mackenass
v. Long, 83 Pa. 158). However, in the present case since delivery was
made upon receipt of only a part of the purchase price, contrary to the
vendor's instruction, he certainly had a right to disaffirm. He does this
by making an immediate demand for payment. He thus rebuts the pre-
sumption of waiver. At this stage Wales undoubtedly could have main-
tained an action of replevin as title had not passed.
Wales undoubtedly could have maintained an action of replevin as title
had not passed.
In answer to Wales's demand, Janeiro makes a counter proposal to
pay the balance in two days. Wales. does not persist in his demand; he
does not bring action but permits Janeiro to retain possession and to use
the wheel not only for two days but for one week. We think in absence
of anything in rebuttal this indicates the intention on the plaintiff's part
to give credit to Janeiro. If credit is given this is a waiver of the con-
ditior of payment, and the contract of sale passes both property and the
right of possession. Benjamin on Sales, p. 353. Therefore, as Wales
lacks the requisites to bring and maintain the action of replevin, the verdict
should be for the defendant.
We can see no grounds whatever for the plaintiff's contention that
there was fraud.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The sale was for cash. So understood Janeiro. So understood
Wales. Wales had not changed his intention ihen he -despatched the boy
to deliver the bicycle. He told the boy -not to deliver it, unless he got
the money. When Wales learned that the boy had left the cycle, upon
securing but $40, he at once tendered back the $40, and demanded the
cycle. Janeiro refused to accept the money or deliver the wheel, saying
to the messenger, that he would in two days, pay the remainder of the
price. Up to this stage in the transaction, nothing indicates an intention
in Wales, to waive the right to be paid in cash and to give credit to
Janeiro. Wales in no way assented to the proposal to'keep the bicycle
and pay in two ddys. What further happens? Doubtless Wales might
have attempted tb take, and possibly might have taken the wheel by force.
Leedom v- Phillips, 1 Y. 527; quoted in French v. Lewis, 218. Pa. 141.
But surely he was not bound to do so, on pain of losing to Janeiro, the
ownership of the thing. He did not endeavor to seize the wheel, but,
after a v~eek elapsed; instituted the action of replevin.
The learned court below thought- not only that this delay pointed ".C)
a'decision, for a while, however brief,, on Wales' part, to give credit to
this vendee, but that it, the court, was competent to draw the inference
of such decision. In this w'e think it was in error. A specific state 6f
mind was to be inferred from a week's inaction, after the refusal of
Janeiro to return the wheel after demand. That inaction is variously
explainable, and what is the proper explanation it is the function of the
jury, not of the court to determine. It is even doubtful whether the jury
should be permitted, without additional evidence, to say that the intention
not to enforce the condition, but to give credit, existed.
The law will not say that, whatever may have been Wales' intention,
he lost the right to enforce the condition by a 10 days' delay. It must
be remembered that there are here no creditors of Janeiro; no purchasers
from him. He is not to be rewarded for his tergiversations by being
made the owner of the bicycle, because Wales did not instantly seize it,
or-begin replevin for it.
That if possession of a thing is retained by its vendee in violation of
a condition of the contract whose non-fulfillment has prevented the pass-
ing of the ownership, the .vendor may recover it by replevin, is not ques-
tioned. French v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141; Henderson v. Hauck, 21 Pa. 359.
'he case in French v. Lewis, supra, differs materially from the present.
The vendor allowed the carriages to remain with the vendee more than
two months before bringing replevin. A note for the price was accepted
on the condition that it would be discounted at a bank. It was found
that it could not be so discounted.'
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
